## 1ac

**1ac – plan**

**The United States federal government should substantially increase financial assistance for aerospace manufacturing towards the United Mexican States.**

**1ac – terror**

**AQAP in Yemen is powerful and is a threat – prefer our case studies**

**Zimmerman 9-18**-13(AQAP's role in the al Qaeda network, [Katherine Zimmerman](http://www.aei.org/scholar/katherine-zimmerman/) is a senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work has focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa. She specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab. Katherine has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. She has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others. Katherine graduated with distinction from Yale University with a B.A. in Political Science and Modern Middle East Studies, | [Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security](http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/zimmerman-testimony-aqaps-role-al-qaeda-network-september-18-2013), September 18, 2013, <http://www.aei.org/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/terrorism/al-qaeda/aqaps-role-in-the-al-qaeda-network/>)

**Case Study**: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula The most direct threat to the U.S. homeland today emanates from AQAP, which has attempted to attack the United States homeland at least three times since its establishment in January 2009. The affiliate is also behind the threat stream that prompted the unprecedented closure of over twenty American diplomatic posts across the Middle East and North Africa. AQAP’s prominence in the al Qaeda network should not be interpreted to mean that AQAP has risen to replace the core group in Pakistan or that it is directing the network in some way. It must be interpreted within the broader context of the al Qaeda network. AQAP is an extremely capable terrorist group that is a member of a network of other groups all operating in similar manners. Its prominence is a reflection of its capabilities and its prioritization of conducting attacks against the U.S., not the subordination of other groups to AQAP. *Background* A January 2009 video announced the establishment of AQAP as a merger between al Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi branches. The video identified four AQAP leaders: two former Guantanamo detainees (Said al Shihri and Mohamed al Awfi) and two escaped Yemeni prisoners (Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi). Saudi al Qaeda operatives, including at least five former Guantanamo detainees who had gone through Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program, had fled to Yemen in the late 2000s to escape the crackdown on al Qaeda in the Kingdom. They began operating with al Qaeda in Yemen, which was on the path to being reconstituted after having been essentially neutralized in 2002-2004. The February 2006 escape of 23 al Qaeda operatives from a Sana’a prison, including Wahayshi and Raymi, revitalized al Qaeda in Yemen. AQAP’s rapid ascendancy in Yemen profited from the expertise of individuals who had been active in the al Qaeda network for years and from the relatively free environment in which these individuals could operate. The senior echelon of AQAP’s leadership structure had decades of combined experience. Many of the senior leaders had trained at al Qaeda’s al Farouq training camp or elsewhere in Afghanistan, some were members of Osama bin Laden’s direct human network, and nearly all had been active in the al Qaeda network before the 9/11 attacks. Yemen’s weak central government, then headed by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, did not exert direct control over its territory and in August 2009 dedicated scarce security resources to fighting the sixth iteration of a rebellion in the north. The Yemeni government also prioritized putting down a rising secessionist movement in the south over counterterrorism operations against AQAP. The permissive security environment along with the leadership’s experience facilitated al Qaeda’s full reconstitution in Yemen in 2009. The group continued the small-scale attacks that al Qaeda in Yemen had been carrying out. But it also began to focus on external operations against Saudi and American targets. AQAP’s first major external operation targeted the Saudi deputy interior ministry in August 2009. Ibrahim al Asiri, the group’s top bombmaker, designed an explosive device that was concealed as a suppository in his brother’s body. The remotely detonated bomb failed to kill the Saudi official. A second plot to hit Saudi targets failed in October when a firefight with Saudi border patrolmen killed Yousef al Shihri and Raed al Harbi, who were smuggling explosives in to Saudi Arabia. AQAP became the first affiliate to target the U.S. homeland in December that year. Asiri modified the design for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who conducted the December 2009 attack. Asiri concealed Abdulmutallab’s bomb in his underwear. The device passed successfully through airport security, but failed to detonate. The attack shone a spotlight on the al Qaeda affiliate and within a month, the U.S. designated AQAP, Wahayshi and Shihri under Executive Order 13224. The al Qaeda affiliate was capable of maintaining two lines of operations by 2010. It continued to pursue attacks on American targets, evidenced by the October 2010 parcel plot. It also increased its focus on fighting the Saleh government, which, under U.S. and international pressure, had begun to intensify its operations against AQAP. The retraction of the Yemeni central state into the capital, Sana’a, due to the political unrest in winter 2011 opened up space for AQAP. The group fielded an insurgent arm operating under the name “Ansar al Sharia” in spring 2011 that seized and held territory in south Yemen. AQAP briefly governed in certain areas, but more significantly, expanded its area of operations outside of its historical terrain. AQAP continues to have a presence in many of these regions, though it has not held territory since spring 2012. Its operatives have also regularly targeted Yemeni political and military officials for assassination, a strategy employed in 2010 and resumed as of 2012. AQAP poses the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland out of the al Qaeda network. It incorporated lessons learned from the experience of al Qaeda in Iraq in building popular support when its insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, tried its hand at governance in 2011 and 2012 (though it ultimately failed). It has responded to shifting conditions on the ground and has attempted to appeal to Yemen’s various anti-government groupings. It has innovated in the design of its explosive devices and repeatedly attempted, with success, to penetrate American national security defenses. Though the affiliate is extremely capable in its own right, it must be examined in the context of the entire al Qaeda network. *New Model for al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates* A major inflection point for the al Qaeda network occurred with the establishment of AQAP. The Yemen-based affiliate created a new model for the role of groups in the al Qaeda network by the end of 2009. The previous model held that groups in the network were subordinated to a “core” group. That core group, which was the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, maintained command and control over its regional affiliates and directed external operations. AQAP is the first known example of an affiliate or an associate directing an attack against the U.S. homeland, an effort the group has continued to prioritize. It also provided training and shared resources with al Qaeda associates in a manner characteristic of bin Laden’s group in the 1990s and early 2000s. The new model indicates that the network is no longer centrally organized or directed, but continued relations between the “core” and AQAP indicate a continued advisory role for the central group. The December 2009 attack on Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines Flight 253 was the first attack from the al Qaeda network on the U.S. homeland directed by an affiliate, as previously mentioned. U.S. court documents related to the case against the underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, provide the details of the plot. Abdulmutallab sought out Yemeni-American cleric and AQAP senior operative Anwar al Awlaki in Yemen, and, after getting in touch through an intermediary and submitting a letter to Awlaki, spent three days with the cleric. Awlaki connected him to the bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, who explained the plan. Abdulmutallab received specialized training on the explosive device and basic military training at one of AQAP’s training camps. He then received orders from Awlaki to detonate the bomb over U.S. airspace and Asiri provided him with the bomb itself. Osama bin Laden mentioned the AQAP-directed attack in a message directed at President Barack Obama, but did not claim credit for it. AQAP’s deputy leader, Said al Shihri, claimed credit for the attack in February 2010. **The Yemen-based affiliate has attempted to attack the U.S. homeland** at least two more times since December 2009. It shipped two explosive devices disguised as printer cartridges in October 2010. The bombs were only discovered with the assistance of Saudi intelligence. AQAP tried again in May 2012 when it innovated on the underwear-bomb design. That plot was uncovered and thwarted by American and foreign intelligence agencies. It is likely that AQAP leadership still seeks to attack the U.S. homeland. AQAP has fostered relations with other groups in the al Qaeda network. (See figure 1.) It has an established relationship with al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia. It provided explosives and basic military training to at least one al Shabaab operative in 2010 and 2011. AQAP also facilitated al Shabaab’s communications with al Qaeda “core,” though al Shabaab also appeared to have a line of communications that ran outside of Yemen as well. Multiple sources document the movement of fighters across the Gulf of Aden. The Arab Spring presented AQAP with the opportunity to develop additional relationships. It purportedly supported the establishment of an al Qaeda-linked cell in Egypt under the leadership of Mohamed Jamal Abu Ahmed by sending him fighters and funding. Mohamed Jamal, a former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, knew AQAP leaders Nasser al Wahayshi, Adil al Abab, and Qasim al Raymi. The Wall Street Journal reported that Jamal’s group was connected to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Nasser al Wahayshi, AQAP’s emir, was also in direct contact with Abdelmalek Droukdel, AQIM’s emir, and the al Qaeda core leadership in Pakistan, in addition to al Shabaab’s leadership. Two separate letters recovered in a document cache in Timbuktu, Mali, reveal Wahayshi’s counsel to Droukdel. In his first letter, dated May 21, 2012, Wahayshi congratulated Droukdel on his progress in Mali and compared AQIM’s relationship with Ansar al Din (an ethnically Tuareg militant Islamist group) with AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia. He advised Droukdel that AQIM could generate support by providing basic services and fulfilling daily needs, like food and water. In his second letter, dated August 6, 2012, Wahayshi explained AQAP’s loss in south Yemen against the Yemeni security forces and cautioned Droukdel against declaring an emirate when he would not be able to fulfill the role of a state. Wahayshi also mentioned he held communications from the core group for Droukdel. Today, AQAP continues to seek to attack the United States and to nurture lateral connections with other groups in the al Qaeda network. It is believed that a credible threat stream from the Arabian Peninsula, where AQAP operates, instigated the closure of diplomatic posts across North Africa and the Middle East. Like other groups in the al Qaeda network, AQAP preferenced its local fight against the Yemeni government during the Arab Spring, but it was also able to sustain a second operational line devoted to attacking the United States. Other al Qaeda groups follow the model established by AQAP today, though many have yet to develop the capabilities to conduct an attack against the U.S. and to support such efforts.

**They will attack the US**

Jim **Kouri, 3-7**- ’12 (Vice President and Public Information Officer of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, has served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country, “Al-Qaeda dangerously close to turning Yemen into a new Afghanistan”, The Examiner)

The Yemeni police and security forces were placed Monday and Tuesday on maximum alert following a weekend of deadly terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who have gained control of most of Yemen's provinces in that country's south, **a U.S. security official** told the Law Enforcement Examiner. The security official **said he and several colleagues believe the next terror threats to be faced by Americans within the continental United States will be perpetrated by Yemeni-connected al-Qaeda terrorists.**  **"It doesn't take much imagination to envision Yemen turning into a new Afghanistan complete with training camps and volunteers to travel to the U.S. and European nations to plan and carry out terrorist attacks**," said the Law Enforcement Examiner's anonymous security source.

**Internal Documents Prove the Threat is Real**

**Washington Times 1/30** 2013

A jihadist website posted a new threat by **al Qaeda this week** that promises to conduct “shocking” attacks on the United States and the West.¶ The posting appeared on the Ansar al Mujahidin network Sunday and carried the headline, “Map of al Qaeda and its future strikes.”¶ The message, in Arabic, asks: “Where will the next strike by al Qaeda be?” A translation was obtained by Inside the Ring.¶ “The answer for it, in short: The coming strikes by al Qaeda, with God’s Might, will be in the heart of the land of nonbelief, America, and in France, Denmark, other countries in Europe, in the countries that helped and are helping France, and in other places that shall be named by al Qaeda at other times,” the threat states.¶ **The attacks will be “strong, serious, alarming, earth-shattering, shocking and terrifying.”**¶Under a section of the post on the method of the attacks, the unidentified writer said the strikes would be “group and lone-wolf operations, in addition to the use of booby-trapped vehicles.”¶ “All operations will be recorded and published in due time,” the message said. “Let France be prepared, and let the helpers of France be prepared, for it is going to be a long war of attrition.”¶ The reference to France appears linked to the group’s plans for retaliation against the French-led military strikes in northern Mali in operations to oust al Qaeda terrorists from the North African country.¶ The Ansar al-Mujahidin network is a well-known jihadist forum that in the past has published reliably accurate propaganda messages from al Qaeda and its affiliates.¶ **U.S. counterterrorism actions over the past 10 years have prevented al Qaeda from conducting major attacks. However, U.S. officials warn that the group continues to be dangerous, despite the killing of its top leaders in drone strikes and special operations.**¶A U.S. official said the threat is being taken seriously by the U.S. government.¶ “Extremists regularly make threats online,” he told Inside the Ring. “This one is not particularly unusual, but of course should be taken seriously.”

**Nuke Terror Outweighs All Other Impacts – Most Likely Scenario For Extinction**

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

**Jaspal**– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan **12** (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an **imprudent policy choice**. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does noteliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that **one should not miscalculate** transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than **120,000** Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). **Numerous evidences confirm** that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy **cannot deter** the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it **might actually welcome** the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included **catalytic effects** on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences **cannot be deterred**” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are **far greater threats** to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states**.**

**1ac – solvency**

**The Shut down nearly decimated investor confidence in Mexican manufacturing**

**Paterson 10-11**-13 Kent Paterson, Frontera NorteSur // October 11, 2013 // Business & Technology “U.S. crisis unsettles Mexico” [http://newspapertree.com/articles/2013/10/11/us-crisis-unsettles-mexico] **[MG]**

The partial shutdown of the U.S. government is unsettling the Mexican economy. As the crisis took shape last week, the Mexican peso dipped to 13.34 units per dollar, an amount which represented the second largest depreciation in 2013. The pending October 17 showdown over the U.S. debt limit is likewise contributing to the jitters, said Gabriela Siller, an analyst for Mexico-based Banco Base. In the Mexico-U.S. border region, Mexican business leaders expressed worry that the political gridlock on the Potomac could deepen and trigger devastating consequences on the assembly-for-export, or maquiladora, industry. In Ciudad Juarez and other border cities, the foreign-owned maquiladora sector constitutes a dominant or major part of the economy. Longer export times, reduced market demand and idled assembly lines are among the concerns voiced by Ciudad Juarez business representatives. “The economy is flowing at the moment, but we don’t know how it is going to behave at the end of the year,” said Rodolfo Martinez Garza, president of the Association of Customs Agents in Ciudad Juarez. Martinez added that the last quarter of the year is the biggest season of import-export activity, and that unstable economic circumstances could result in stagnation. “There is a lot of uncertainty for investment and this is very negative for Ciudad Juarez,” Martinez said. According to Mexico’s National Council of the Maquiladora Industry and Export Manufacturing, any effects of the U.S. shutdown should be measurable in industrial production after October 20. Thomas Fullerton, economist for the University of Texas at El Paso, said the impacts of the U.S. government shutdown on the maquildora industry – which also supports thousands of jobs in his city – could be worse than the previous one in 1995-96 because of the still-incomplete recovery from the 2008 economic crash. The U.S. crisis comes at a time when worries already exist over the state of the Mexican economy and the tax reform looming in the Mexican Congress, including a possible hike in the border region sales tax from its current 11 percent to 16 percent. In Ciudad Juarez, many business, community and political leaders oppose the sales tax hike and warn of an outflow of pesos to neighboring Texas and New Mexico, where sales taxes are much lower, if the Mexican Congress increases the tax this fall under the proposal advanced by the Pena Nieto administration. This week, a coalition of popular organizations, tire and used car industry groups delivered at petition with 12,733 signatures against the sales tax hike to Congresswoman Martha Beatriz Cordoba. A member of the Citizen Movement party, Corboba has emerged as a leader against a higher tax. The political turmoil and debates in both Washington and Mexico City occur at a moment when indicators reveal some **adverse trends in the Mexican economy**. On October 8, the **I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und projected that Mexico’s 2013 growth rate would be **a mere 1.2 percent** – far less than the growth in the 3 percent range widely predicted earlier in the year. In the Latin American and Caribbean group of nations, Mexico’s growth performance puts it in the same general camp this year as Brazil, Venezuela and Jamaica. Agustin de la Torre, chief economist for the World Bank, was surprised by the weak Mexican growth report. “We do not have an easy explanation on why Mexico did not recuperate,” de la Torre said. “Without a doubt, there is an enormous contrast between the perception that investors have of Mexico in light of structural reforms on the one hand and the low growth this year on the other.”

**Foreign investment is key to evolve factories technologically—**

**Rapiey ‘11** Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011

A third challenge associated with this system concerns the lack of complexity of the production performed by the maquiladoras. The vast majority of maquiladoras conduct simple assembly, so the factories involved are tooled for basic production, and the employees only have basic skills. This drastically limits the ability of both the factories and their employees to adjust to new forms of production as the maquiladoras fall to foreign competitors. This industry is so tightly tied to specific customers in the U.S. that a transition to some other form of production would require massive changes in structure and labor. The Mexican government understands this as a problem and seeks to drive the evolution of so-called “first generation” maquiladoras to second and third generation models. The first generation maquiladoras are the least complex and simply assemble raw materials. **Foreign investment** brings with it technology, and, with this technology, the maquiladoras evolve into more complex factories that eventually focus less on labor intensity and more on more sophisticated products, R&D and even product design.39 Unfortunately, there are few examples of this trend, and many critics complain that the entire concept of the maquiladora “traps developing countries into the deadend role of providing cheap labor for low value-added assembly operations.”40

**Absent Investment Mexico Manufacturing Will Collapse**

**Rapiey ‘11** Stanley Joseph Rapiey, Department of Defense Civilian “Maquiladoras and National Security: Design Theory as a Guide.” 25, October, 2011 **[MG]**

The Mexican maquiladora industry is rapidly losing market share to Asian competitors that dramatically undercut them in terms of labor cost. The decline of these assembly-for-export factories will result in instability along the U.S.-Mexico border and will prove to be a serious **national security** issue for the United States. This paper leverages Design theory to frame the problems surrounding Mexico’s maquiladora industry in order to develop an understanding of this complex adaptive system. It examines the wide range of actors involved in the system, focusing on their goals, motivations and conflicting tendencies. Finally, the paper recommends courses of action for U.S. and Mexican leaders that will mitigate the resulting instability in the Mexican northern border states. The economic stability of Mexico will always be a national security priority for the United States. The two nations share a **border of nearly 2,000 miles**, and trade between them is worth **billions of dollars**. To take advantage of this relationship, the Mexican government created a series of customs and trade policies specifically designed to enhance its economic ties to the U.S. For decades, such policies greatly benefited Mexico’s maquiladoras, factories that import raw materials, rapidly combine them into finished products, and export them to the American market. Unfortunately for Mexico, the strong advantages in low-cost labor and speedy delivery are gradually being eroded by similar programs in China and Southeast Asia. As U.S. companies look to Asia for more profitable business relationships, the Mexican government has done little to alter its customs and trade policies in response. A severe economic blow to the maquiladoras along the U.S. border would have dramatic effects on the stability of the area, affecting both Mexican and American national security interests. The governments of Mexico and the **U**nited **S**tates should therefore take preemptive measures to mitigate the instability that is arising as the maquiladoras lose their viability under new global economic pressures. These measures include **altering customs and trade policies**, **providing economic incentives** in order to transform the Mexican export industry, and **creating labor opportunities** for Mexicans within the United States. In order to support this thesis, the following paper will leverage Design Theory to examine the current situation in the Mexican maquiladora industry, identify problems in terms of potential impacts to U.S. national security, and propose possible courses of action for both American and Mexican decision-makers.

**Mexican manufacturing key to US aerospace**

**Mecham 7/16** (Michael is apace writer for Gannett News, California Bureau Chief and correspondent for Congress, Aviation Week, 7/16/13, “Mexico’s Welcome Mat Attracts Aerospace Manufacturers”, <http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_04_01_2013_p44-562383.xml>\)

The aerospace influx has not happened overnight. Its roots date to the mid-1970s when U.S. companies, a mix of multinationals and lower-tier suppliers, began sending basic parts manufacturing and assembly tasks across the border, mostly to border towns like Tijuana and Mexicali but also deeper into the country to cities like Monterrey. Service operations followed, as did company research activities. However, it has been in the past decade that Mexico's aerospace manufacturing growth has mushroomed. Political reform led it to pursue a global free trade agenda vigorously and its 1994 signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) benefitted Mexico greatly. Still, it took about a decade for the aerospace sector to take off. Until 2004, growth was scattered, says Queretaro state Gov. Jose Calzada. Not anymore. “We've seen incredible changes in just the last five years,” he says The boom times are a testament to Mexico's geography, its embrace of free trade and adoption of legal mechanisms that provide a “soft landing” for foreign-owned factories. Local leaders clear red tape and amaze U.S. and European executives at how quickly they can put up factories. A typical response comes from Peter Huij, a senior Fokker Aerostructures executive in Chihuahua, about how quickly the company went from bare earth in May 2011 to a completed 75,000-sq.-ft. factory in November: “It would be impossible in Europe.” Behind all of this is Mexico's Maquiladora factory system for supporting foreign companies, which allows them to control their own destiny, importing raw materials such as **aerospace-quality alloys**, or wiring and then exporting the finished product tax-free. Foreign manufacturers commonly turn to a large service provider—Intermex and American Industries Group are leaders for the aerospace sector—that lease buildings to their clients and handle their human resources, tax and other business needs under Mexican law. About 80% of the aerospace companies in Mexico use such services. Of the 36 Maquiladoras registered by the Mexican government last year, six were in aerospace, including a GKN Aerospace plant in Mexicali, Latecoere in Hermosillo, coatings specialist Ellison Surface Technologies and Rolls-Royce turbine supplier JJ Churchill in Guaymas and a fourth division for Zodiac in Chihuahua. Under the Maquiladora system, Mexico allows resident foreign companies to control 100% of their businesses. They do not face the “local partner” rules so common elsewhere that limit foreigners to a maximum 49% share “They make it easy for you to do business down here,” says John Gardner, strategic program manager at Kaman Aerostructures, another newcomer in Chihuahua. “They provide a 'soft landing,' to get a quick startup—a good startup. We got a lot of support up front and afterward.”

**The Plan Solves Innovation – Absent Investment Opportunities US Aerospace Will Be Stagnant**

William O. **Fisher**, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, MA Candidate US Army War College **2010** USAWC CLASS OF 2010 U.S. Space Policy And Space Industry Strangulation

**These realms are** not mutually exclusive**. If technologies are overly guarded and profits cannot be realized, then innovators will choose other markets and development of U.S. space related technologies will atrophy.** There is an opportunity cost in this atrophy as **U.S. technology development will not occur, or will lag behind other nation state competitors.** The third consideration to the balance between national security and market development is its effect on recruitment and retention of quality personnel into the U.S. space industry. **If the industry, or market, is not healthy, then talented personnel will choose to work in other industries thus exacerbating the lack of technology development and the lag behind nation state competitors.** It is within this tensional environment that an effective space policy must be written and executed. This paper reviews U.S. space policy history and examines the effects of the Arms Control Export Act of 1976, United States Munitions List, International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the shift of human capital on U.S. national security and the U.S. space industry.

**Mexico can produce drones – open licensing is necessary to overall production**

**Godoy 5/11**/13 – Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, journalist since 1996 and has written for various media outlets in Mexico, Central America and Spain (Emilio, “Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace”, Tierramerica, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/)

MEXICO CITY, Apr 11 2013 (IPS) - Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. **Working on the basis of open licensing**, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

**This is the Only Way to Sustain Drone Production – Political Restrictions Are Limiting Domestic Production and Driving Away Investors**

**THE ASSOCIATED PRESS** MARCH 29, **2013**, 11:05 AM

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/drone-industry-worries-privacy-backlash-article-1.1302461#ixzz2i8PsIV8C

It's a good bet that in the not-so-distant future aerial drones will be part of Americans' everyday lives, performing countless useful functions.¶ A far cry from the killing machines whose missiles incinerate terrorists, these generally small, unmanned aircraft will help farmers more precisely apply water and pesticides to crops, saving money and reducing environmental impacts. They'll help police departments find missing people, reconstruct traffic accidents and act as lookouts for SWAT teams. They'll alert authorities to people stranded on rooftops by hurricanes and monitor evacuation flows.¶ Real estate agents will use them to film videos of properties and surrounding neighborhoods. States will use them to inspect bridges, roads and dams. Oil companies will use them to monitor pipelines, while power companies use them to monitor transmission lines.¶ With military budgets shrinking, drone makers have been counting on the civilian market to spur the industry's growth. But there's an ironic threat to that hope: Success on the battlefield may contain the seeds of trouble for the more benign uses of drones at home.¶ The civilian unmanned aircraft industry worries that it will be grounded before it can really take off because of fear among the public that the technology will be misused. Also problematic is a delay in the issuance of government safety regulations that are needed before drones can gain broad access to U.S. skies.¶ Some companies that make drones or supply support equipment and services say the uncertainty has caused them to put U.S. expansion plans on hold**, and they are looking overseas for new markets.**¶"Our lack of success in educating the public about unmanned aircraft is coming back to bite us," said Robert Fitzgerald, CEO of The BOSH Group of Newport News, Va., which provides support services to drone users. "The U.S. has been at the lead of this technology a long time," he said. "If our government holds back this technology, there's the freedom to move elsewhere ... and all of a sudden these things will be flying everywhere else and competing with us."

**1ac – assumptions**

**Drones Are Key to Decapitating AQAP – Criticisms That Highlight Blowback Wrongly Link Drone Strikes to Recruitment and Overstate the Negative Consequences – Only Increasing the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes Can Drain AQAPs Legitimacy and Create Space for Alternative Engagement Strategies**

By Stacey **Emker** second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations **January 14**, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, **the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes**.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage **is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen.** Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that **AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes**, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, **a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed** expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign**. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists**, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. **The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen**, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, **requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance**.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the **costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP** within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, **debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation.** By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

**Absent Successful Drone Strikes All Alternative Methods Fail**

By Daniel **Green** Soref fellow at The Washington Institute and a military veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq. **January 24**, 2013 Al-Qaeda's Soft Power Strategy in Yemen http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/24/al-qaedas\_soft\_power\_strategy\_in\_yemen\_100502-full.html

Learning from jihadist mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (**AQAP**) has become adept at aligning with local political movements and building popular support in Yemen. In doing so, it has morphed into an insurgency while retaining its roots as a terrorist group. To counter the group's political, legal, and social-welfare efforts in areas outside the capital, the Yemeni and U.S. governments must supplement their counterterrorism campaign by expanding services to the provinces in a decentralized fashion.¶ BACKGROUND¶ Since its founding in January 2009, AQAP has repeatedly attacked the United States and its interests. Washington has responded by significantly expanding its drone strikes in Yemen and bolstering the government's ability to fight AQAP itself through additional military aid and training.¶ When the Arab Spring began to sweep the region in 2011, a political crisis emerged in Yemen between then president Ali Saleh, who had ruled for over thirty years, and opponents who criticized the regime's corruption, lack of services, and leadership. As the crisis unfolded, Yemeni security forces became involved in political struggles in Sana, with many units moving from the south to the capital. Sensing a vacuum, AQAP launched a series of raids throughout the south that year, using conventional tactics to overrun large swathes of territory, including many districts and a provincial capital.¶ HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN¶ After seizing control of various southern Yemeni towns and districts, AQAP moved beyond its terrorist focus, adopting the characteristics of an insurgency and holding territory in order to create a nascent government. Its ability to do so was based not only on its enhanced military capabilities and the departure of government security forces, but also on its effective community engagement strategy.¶ Capitalizing on longstanding southern grievances regarding insufficient education, healthcare, security, rule of law, political representation, and economic development, AQAP sought to replicate the central government's functions throughout the region. Its political agents established a form of stability based on Islamic law, convening regular meetings with community leaders, solving local problems, and attempting to replace chaotic tribal feuds with a more ordered and religiously inspired justice system. This effort included mitigating tribal conflicts, protecting weaker tribes from stronger rivals, and creating opportunities for some ambitious locals, including weaker tribal factions, to rise beyond their social position and seize power in their communities. AQAP also provided humanitarian assistance such as fresh water and food for the indigent, basic healthcare, and educational opportunities (albeit only Quranic teachings).¶ Many of these efforts appealed to the population, not only because they were better than what the local government had provided, but also because many tribal sheiks had previously been discredited for not living up to their responsibilities. Additionally, Quran-based engagement was highly appealing to communities in which that book was often the only text residents knew.¶ Al-Qaeda's strategy in Yemen reflects many of the lessons it learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it frequently alienated locals through the brutality of its rule. In addition, Yemeni tribal structures are far stronger than in those two countries, and tribal leaders are much more adept at governing their traditional areas of control. AQAP has therefore pursued a softer approach not simply because it wants to, but because it must, since the tribes have far greater power than it currently wields.¶ AQAP has also been effective at joining its cause with local political movements in Yemen, as it did in Iraq with Sunni Arab nationalists. To date, it has aligned its interests with southern elements seeking greater autonomy from the central government or complete independence from Yemen (though it is probably not working with the longstanding Southern Mobility Movement).¶ ¶ ¶ Finally, al-Qaeda does not have as strong a foreign character in Yemen as it did in previous conflicts. This reduces Washington and Sana's ability to separate the population from the terrorist group by using national pride, ethnic/tribal differences, or simple xenophobia to rebuff AQAP's advances.¶ REPULSED BUT NOT REJECTED¶ Last year, in response to **AQAP**'s gains, the Yemeni military launched widespread operations against the group's forces in the south. Although these efforts were largely successful in pushing AQAP out of areas it overran in 2011, the group **continues to pose a threat.** Having retreated to its traditional safe havens in the interior, al-Qaeda has since undertaken a concerted assassination campaign against Yemeni security, military, and intelligence officials as it reconstitutes its forces.¶ In addition, the group still commands sympathy and influence in the south. To be sure, AQAP eventually reverted to harsh rule in many communities once it consolidated power there, alienating many locals and spurring the exodus of thousands from areas under its sway. Yet many others remain sympathetic to the group, not just for religious or culturally conservative reasons, but also out of a general feeling that al-Qaeda, with all its imperfections, is still a better alternative than the Yemeni government.¶ Although relief efforts for war refugees did much to improve Sana's image among southerners, only a sustained governance and development initiative -- one highly synchronized with military clearing and holding operations against AQAP -- will consolidate support for the central government. Yet this sort of initiative **will not come naturally to Sana or Washington**. The lack of such efforts following last year's clearing operations is already undermining popular support, creating another opportunity for a chastened but resilient AQAP to leverage the south against the central government. The group is already adapting its community engagement strategy by apologizing for the excesses of its recent rule and making overtures to key local leaders to lay the groundwork for reasserting control.

**That Makes Boots on the Ground Inevitable**

Vladislav **Gulevich** **3-8**-11 Geopolitical Dimension of the Rebellion in Yemen. Oriental Review.Org < http://orientalreview.org/2011/03/08/geopolitical-dimension-of-the-rebellion-in-yemen/>

The Shia insurgency can trigger unrest in the neighboring Oman, where the Shiites are politically under-represented. A conflict of such proportions has a potential to translate into destabilization across the entire Arabian Peninsula, to erode the US dominance in the region, and to empower Iran as a result. The US is worried about possibly ceding control over the Gulf of Aden to Iran which has already built a naval base in Eritrea, just across the Red Sea, and is backing Shia protests in Bahrain which hosts a US naval base and the US 5th Navy command. US and French soldiers are deployed in Djibouti which shares a border with Eritrea. Iran is not Washington’s only headache in the region — China is also in the spotlight. The US cherishes control over Yemen’s Aden seaport which it can use to seal off the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb serving as China’s main commercial inlet to the Red Sea. The stakes running high, the US establishment is increasingly audible about a military intervention in Yemen. Congressman J. Lieberman said Iraq was yesterday’s war, Afghanistan — today’ war, and Yemen would be tomorrow’s war if the US showed enough foresight. It seems that Washington is trying to, massively dispatching intelligence operatives and military instructors to Yemen. US pilots disguised as local air force staff are known to have bombed the positions of the Shia insurgents. US drones and the technicians taking care of them are coming to Yemen, Djibouti, and Kenya in large numbers. The impression is that for the US Saleh is a discounted figure. Even if he manages to hold out till the 2013 elections, his more distant political future hardly stands a chance.

**That Would Be Net Worse For Blowback – Massively Increases AQAP Recruitment Pools**

By Stacey **Emker** second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations **January 14**, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

On the other hand, **drone strikes in Yemen have been beneficial in the fight against AQAP**. As previously stated, AQAP is plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and maintains the capability to attack within U.S. borders. Compared to other military objectives in the “war on terror,” **there are no troops on the ground in Yemen**, reducing the cost of military intervention and anti-American resentment through occupation. In addition, military pressure on AQAP through occupation would likely inflict far more civilian casualties on the Yemeni population than collateral damage from drone strikes. From this standpoint, **drones are seen as an efficient tool to gather intelligence and target AQAP members.**

**Prefer Our Evidence Over Their Generic Overarching Claims – That’s Critical to Rethinking**

**Rosato and Schuessler 11** –Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame AND Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College

(Sebastian and John, “A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States”, Perspectives on Politics December 2011 Vol. 9 No. 4)

One reason for this attitude is that political scientists tend to shy away from policy relevant work. According to Joseph Nye, “scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world.” 6 Why academics have withdrawn to the ivory tower is an open question, but the profession’s attitude toward policy work—ranging from indifference to hostility—is at least partially to blame. “In many departments,” notes Nye, “a focus on policy can hurt one’s career.” 7 Walt reaches the same conclusion: “Policy relevance is simply not a criterion that the academy values. Indeed, **there is a clear bias against it**.” 8 Similarly, Bruce Jentleson and Ely Ratner declare that “academia’s dominant organizational culture . . . **devalues policy relevance**.” 9 Our own position is that **political scientists** **can** **and** **should contribute to policy debates**. The reason that political scientists can make a valuable contribution is simple, but cannot be repeated enough: **theory and policy are inextricably linked**. Although they may not be self-conscious in their use of theory, policy makers ﬁgure out what events or factors to focus on and what policies to pursue based on the theories they ﬁnd most convincing. As Walt points out, theory is indispensable **to policy**—to the extent that it helps decision makers to diagnose their problems, to anticipate events, to formulate prescriptions for action, and to evaluate the results of their policies. 10 Thus, **we have a responsibility as scholars to** **foster a robust debate** **about our preferred theories** and their competitors. After all, wise policy choices depend on a vigorous marketplace of ideas. 11 Political scientists should contribute to these debates as scholars, which is to say that t**hey must be attentive to logic and evidence**. As PatrickThaddeus Jackson and Stuart Kaufman explain, if we want to remain “on the scientiﬁc side of the thin line separating science from politics,” the key issue is “whether, given our assumptions, our conclusions follow rigorously from the evidence and logic we provide.” 12 In the case at hand, this involves two tasks. First, we must take a handful of plausible assumptions and logically deduce a set of foreign policy prescriptions. Second, we must show— through a detailed examination of the historical record— that had states adhered to these prescriptions, they would likely have enhanced their security without going to war and, conversely, that their embrace of alternative theories of action led them down the path to war.

**This education is uniquely important because post 9-11 responses to terror makes some government violence inevitable – the only way to ensure that violence doesn’t escalate out of control is by rejecting the impulse of utopianism and learning to debate about the consequences of political adoption**

Michael **Ignatieff**, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, **2004** Lesser Evils p. 18-19

To insist that justified exercises of coercion can be defined as a lesser evil is to say that evil can be qualified. If two acts are evil, how can we say that one is the lesser, the other the greater? Qualifying evil in this way would seem to excuse it. Yet it is essential to the idea of a lesser evil that one can justify resort to it without denying that it is evil, justifiable only because other means would be insufficient or unavailable. Using the word evil rather than the word harm is intended to highlight the elements of moral risk that a liberal theory of government believes are intrinsic to the maintenance of order in any society premised upon the dignity of individuals. Thus even in times of safety, liberal democracies seek to limit the use of force necessary to their maintenanc**e**. These limits seek to balance the conflict between the commitments to individual dignity incarnated in rights and the commitments to majority interest incarnated in popular sovereignty. In times of danger, this conflict of values becomes intense. The suppression of civil liberties, surveillance of individuals, targeted assassination, torture, and preemptive war put liberal commitments to dignity under such obvious strain, and the harms they entail are so serious, that, even if mandated by peremptory majority interest, they should be spoken of only in the language of evil. In a war on terror, I would argue, the issue is not whether we can avoid evil acts altogether, but whether we can succeed in choosing lesser evils and keep them from becoming greater ones. We should do so, I would argue, by making some starting commitments—to the conservative principle (maintaining the free institutions we have), to the dignity principle (preserving individuals from gross harms)—and then **reasoning out the consequences of various courses of action, anticipating harms and coming to a rational judgment of which course of action is likely to inflict the least damage** on the two principles. When we are satisfied that a coercive measure is a genuine last resort, justified by the facts as we can understand them, we have chosen the lesser evil, and we are entitled to stick to it even if the price proves higher than we anticipated. But not indefinitely so. At some point—when we "have to destroy the village in order to save it"—we may conclude that we have slipped from the lesser to the greater. Then we have no choice but to admit our error and reverse course. In the situation of factual uncertainty in which most decisions about terrorism have to be taken, error is probably unavoidable. It is tempting to suppose that moral life can avoid this slope simply by avoiding evil means altogether**. But no such angelic option may exist.** Either we fight evil with evil or we succumb. So if we resort to the lesser evil, we should do so, first, in full awareness that evil is involved. Second, we should act under a demonstrable state of necessity. Third, we should chose evil means only as a last resort, having tried everything else. Finally, we must satisfy a fourth obligation: **we** must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit to their judgment as to their correctness.

## 2ac

### 2ac – case

#### Their criticism is based on a poorly researched caricature of terrorism studies, orthodox analysis includes a self-reflexive element that makes the permutation more likely to succeed than the alternative. Pure rejection of the Western social order won’t replace terrorism discourse and is likely to reinforce the totalitarian impulse of al Qaeda

Schmid, 9 - Chair in International Relations; the Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University(Alex, Perspectives on Terrorism, v.3, issue 4, Book Review of “Critical Terrorism Studies. A new research agenda. by Richard Jackson”, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com\_rokzine&view=article&id=96

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman they set up to shoot - ”orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and blind on one eye.

**Terrorist ideology is the root cause, not language—only the war on terror solves.**

**Epstein 05** (Alex, **analyst at the Ayn Rand Institute,** BA in Philosophy from Duke University, “Fight the Root of Terrorism With Bombs, Not Bread”, San Fransisco Chronicle, 8/14, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11243&news\_iv\_ctrl=1021)

In light of the recent suicide bombings in London, and the general inability of the West to prevent terrorist attacks, there is much talk about fighting the "root cause" of terrorism. The most popular argument is that terrorism is caused by poverty. The United Nations and our European and Arab "allies" repeatedly tell us to minimize our military operations and instead dole out more foreign aid to poor countries--to put down our guns and pick up our checkbook. Only by fighting poverty, the refrain goes, can we address the "root cause" of terrorism. The pernicious idea that poverty causes terrorism has been a popular claim since the attacks of September 11. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly asked wealthy nations to double their foreign aid, naming as a cause of terrorism "that far too many people are condemned to lives of extreme poverty and degradation." Former Secretary of State Colin Powell agrees: "We have to put hope back in the hearts of people. We have to show people who might move in the direction of terrorism that there is a better way." Businessman Ted Turner also concurs: "The reason that the World Trade Center got hit is because there are a lot of people living in abject poverty out there who don't have any hope for a better life."   Indeed, the argument that poverty causes terrorism has been central to America’s botched war in Iraq--which has focused, not on quickly ending any threat the country posed and moving on to other crucial targets, but on bringing the good life to the Iraqi people.   Eliminating the root of terrorism is indeed a valid goal--but properly targeted military action, not welfare handouts, is the means of doing so.   Terrorism is not caused by poverty. The terrorists of September 11 did not attack America in order to make the Middle East richer. To the contrary, their stated goal was to repel any penetration of the prosperous culture of the industrialized "infidels" into their world. The wealthy Osama bin Laden was not using his millions to build electric power plants or irrigation canals. If he and his terrorist minions wanted prosperity, they would seek to emulate the United States--not to destroy it.   More fundamental, poverty as such cannot determine anyone's code of morality. It is the ideas that individuals choose to adopt which make them pursue certain goals and values. A desire to destroy wealth and to slaughter innocent, productive human beings cannot be explained by a lack of money or a poor quality of life--only by anti-wealth, anti-life ideas. These terrorists are motivated by the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism. This other-worldly, authoritarian doctrine views America's freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly pleasures as the height of depravity. Its adherents resent America's success, along with the appeal its culture has to many Middle Eastern youths. To the fundamentalists, Americans are "infidels" who should be killed. As a former Taliban official said, "The Americans are fighting so they can live and enjoy the material things in life. But we are fighting so we can die in the cause of God."   The terrorists hate us because of their ideology--a fact that filling up the coffers of Third World governments will do nothing to change.

#### Fear of nuclear terror is inevitable—the only question is whether we allow that fear to consume us or if we use it to motivate action.

Jenkins 08, senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation and one of the world's leading authorities on terrorism, 10-20-2K8 (Brian Michael, founder of the RAND Corporation's terrorism research program and has served as an advisor to the federal government and the private sector on the subject. Formerly an Army captain who served with Special Forces in Vietnam and former deputy chairman of Kroll Associates, “Expert says nuclear terrorism is not a major threat”, Interview conducted by James Kitfield, National Journal)

NJ: To what do you attribute that fear? Jenkins: I concluded that there is a difference between nuclear terrorism and nuclear terror. Nuclear terrorism is about the possibility that terrorists will acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon. Nuclear terror, on the other hand, concerns our anticipation of such an attack. It's about our imagination. And while there is no history of nuclear terrorism, there is a rich history of nuclear terror. It's deeply embedded in our popular culture and in policy-making circles. NJ: So the fear of nuclear terrorism is not new? Jenkins: Almost as soon as the people involved in the Manhattan Project tested an actual atomic bomb they started to wonder about the possibility of someone using it for terrorist purposes. In the 1970s, some talented nuclear weapons designers studied the issue of whether someone outside of a government program could possibly design and build a workable nuclear weapon. They concluded it was possible, and then postulated who might do such a thing -- terrorists! So, in a way, the threat preceded any terrorist actually thinking about the issue. To a certain extent, we educated the terrorists on the subject.

### 2ac – t

#### Counter Interpretation – Conditional and unconditional engagement are topical

Haass 2k – Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June,

<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf>?1

Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. *Conditional* engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the United States offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, *unconditional* engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

### 2ac – k

#### The gap between theory and praactice must be bridged by paying greater attention to details of specific policy implementation. Increasing our exposure to real-world political situations is necessary in the aftermath of September 11th.

Bruce W. Jentleson (Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University) spring 2002 International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 pp. 169–183

In the contemporary era, when debate rages not only over the foreign policy “answers” but even more fundamentally over what the defining “questions” are, dominant disciplinary norms and practices are widening the theory-policy gap, and leaving the university-based scholarly world increasingly isolated. Moreover, whereas thirty or forty years ago academics were the main if not sole cohort of experts on international affairs outside of government and international institutions, today’s world is a more competitive marketplace of ideas and expertise. The think tank world has grown and deepened—there are more of them dealing with a broader range of issues, and often doing so in ways that contribute significantly to literature building as well as policy debate. Many of the leading area and country specialists are now journalists who have done their own empirical work of intensive coverage of world trouble spots, and are also sufficiently grounded in relevant academic literature to use and contribute to it.

It is both in the discipline’s self-interest and part of its societal responsibility to link its scholarly mission more to the challenges that face the world. This was true before September 11; it is even truer since then. Policy relevance needs to be brought back in to international relations and to political science more generally.

This is not an argument against theory. It is an argument for theory but with shifts in relative emphasis to foster greater policy relevance.31 Theory can have three important policy utilities. One is its diagnostic value. Policymakers need to be able to assess the nature of the problem they face, the trend they are observing, and the incipient warning signs they may be sensing. Often the problem is less a dearth than a glut of information and the need to discern patterns, establish salience, and trace causal connections.What can otherwise be a seemingly overwhelming amount of information and detail can be organized, prioritized, and filtered through the framework that theory provides.

Second, theory can have prescriptive value in contributing to the “conceptualization of strategies.” Such analysis, while abstract and not itself in operational form, “identifies the critical variables of a strategy and the general logic associated with [its] successful use.” Theory thus “is not in itself a strategy,” but it is a valuable “starting point for constructing a strategy.”32 It must be combined with other types of knowledge, especially specific understanding of the particular situation and actor at hand. Its value often is in providing the framework for putting a particular situation and strategy in the type of broader context that can facilitate the design and implementation of effective strategies. Third, theory can help with lesson drawing. It is bad enough for a policy to fail; but if the wrong lessons are drawn, that failure can have an additive and even a multiplier effect. Similarly, the benefits of a policy success can be countered by lessons poorly drawn and leading to some future misapplication of what worked the first time. Theory deepens understanding of patterns of causality within any particular case by penetrating beyond the situational and particularistic to identify independent variables of a more fundamental nature. It also helps broaden what can be learned from any particular subject or case. Bringing policy relevance back in thus does not mean driving theory out. International Organization, World Politics, International Security, and the American Political Science Review should continue to have distinct missions from Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and the like. But that distinction should be in terms of how policy problems are approached, not whether attention is paid to them. Greater pride of place needs to be given to research questions defined in policy terms. What drives terrorism? Which strategies can be most effective in deterring it, defeating it, containing it? How better to link force and diplomacy? What about prevention, and questions raised about reducing and countering the political, social, and economic dynamics that foster and feed terrorism? Beyond just general arguments about unilateralism and multilateralism, what strategies and structures can best achieve the goals of peace, security, stability, and justice? These are all September 11 questions—comparable delineations could be drawn for those other areas of the international agenda that were there on September 10 and have not gone away. The demand for policy relevant research is huge; it is the supply that is lagging. This sense of praxis also needs to reshape graduate programs. A Ph.D. in political science or international relations should prepare students for selected nonacademic policy careers as well as academic careers. Curriculums need to have a greater degree of flexibility and pluralism with disciplinary training still at the core but also giving greater weight to substantive depth and breadth of knowledge about policy issues and domains, about regions and countries, about cultures and languages and histories. Greater engagement outside the academy needs to be fostered and encouraged: internships in Washington or with international organizations or nongovernmental organizations, participation in colloquiums not just with noted academics but with eminent policy experts, and dissertation and research projects that lead to immersion in key policy issues whether historical or contemporary. Nor is this just a matter of adapting curriculums. It is as much about the messages sent, explicitly and implicitly, in the setting of expectations and other aspects of the socialization that is so much a part of the graduate school experience. None of this will have much impact unless the academic job market also shifts toward comparable balance and pluralism in the proles being sought for entry-level faculty. Also, a student who takes his or her Ph.D. into a career in the policy world needs to be seen as another type of placement success, not a placement failure. Greater engagement with and experience in the policy world is to be encouraged at all stages of a career. There are many opportunities—and there can be more—to help broaden perspectives, build relationships and test and sharpen arguments and beliefs in constructive ways. The same is true for engaging as a public intellectual in the ways and on the terms discussed earlier.

#### Critical terror studies are wrong – no evidence to substantiate their claims and no viable alternative

Jones and Smith, 9 - \* University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND \*\* King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,“We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 **–** 302**,** Taylor and Francis)

The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead, the journal's ambition is to deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word “terror,” its manipulation by ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of “orthodox” terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is, of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have any substance?

Significantly, the original proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard Jackson, suggested some uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. *Critical Studies on Terrorism* appeared last on a list where the first choice was *Review of Terror Studies*. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask, what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve?

What it Means to be Critical

The editors and contributors explore what it means to be “critical” in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is “a growth industry,” observing with a mixture of envy and disapproval that “literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year” (pp. l-2). In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western democratic state's security perspective.

Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation “terror” is, for the critical theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains, “acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and a few thousand casualties *per year over the entire world*” (original italics) (p. 1). The United States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects.1 At the same time, the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been “silenced from public and … academic discourse” (p. 1).

The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism” (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten “myths” informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that these myths reflect a “state centric security focus,” where analysts rarely consider “the violence perpetrated by the state” (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is “central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as political action,” that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to be “the terrorist's best friend” (p. 7).

Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on … grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.

Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position. Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).

Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes “*the* single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby *lack* turns to*excess*” (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65-79), reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).

Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy *petitio principii*. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.

Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in 'terrorist' activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of *Meibion Glyndwr* who would as a matter of principle avoid *pob sais* like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.

A consequence of avoiding primary research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with “the particular dynamics of the political world” (p. 70). Analogously, Stohl claims that “the US and English [sic] media” exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist acts, which reduces “structural and political problems” into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both their practice and their research ethics.

By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and, for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the *Shorter Oxford Dictionary* would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, “reflexivity” is made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity “to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling … is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation” (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore, somewhat repetitively, its implications.

Reflexive or Defective?

Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse, the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce *ex cathedra*, “refers to the *response* to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.

In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism'” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke “*questions the question*.” This intellectual *potpourri* apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).

Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.

The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language.

The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.

It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.

What is To Be Done?

This ontological confusion notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics. “[*C*]*ritical knowledge*,” Booth declares, “*involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures, processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality derive from particular social/historical conditions*” (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with “*big-picture* navigation aids” (original italics) (p. 66) to achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, “God Almighty only gave us ten”). When not stating the staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory. Critical theorists thus should “avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,”3 “recognize that states can be agents of terrorism,” and “keep the long term in sight.” Unexceptional advice to be sure and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she or he lives within “Powerful theories” that are “constitutive of political, social, and economic life” (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction to “stand outside” prevailing ideologies (p. 78).

In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an “academic international relations” whose role “is not only to interpret the world but to change it” (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academic—or more precisely, critical—international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists.

The political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar transformative praxis and this leads “critical global theorizing” into a curiously confused empathy with the motives of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between “those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify it—is not as great as is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press” (p. 66). The gap “between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm” (p. 66). So, while “terrorist actions are always—without exception—wrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable” (p. 66). From this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable.

On the basis of this worrying relativism a further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an “attractive force.” To understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, “its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be understood apart from its evilness.”4

The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their “responsible research ethics.” The paradox is resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the “ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other.” For Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing “with the ethic of responsibility” faced by those who, “in extremis” “have some explosives” (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the analyst, not only to “critique” the “strategic languages” of the West, but also to “take in” the “side of the Other” or more particularly “engage” “with the highly developed forms of thinking” that provides groups like Al Qaeda “with legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity” (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only to empathize with the “other,” but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his *Messages to the West* and Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto *Milestones* not only offer “well observed” criticisms of Western decadence, but also “converges with elements of critical theory” (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape.

Histrionically Speaking

Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.

On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives … or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).

At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.

In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “*terror has multiple forms*” (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the *engagee* intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).

Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its “strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).

In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of *soi-disant* cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.

In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.

Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.

Critical Studies and Strategic Theory—A Missed Opportunity

Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John Horgan and Michael Boyle who put “A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies'” (pp. 51-74). Although they do not seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that critical self-reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies. It is ironic, in fact, that the most clearly reflective, original, and *critical* contribution in the first edition should come from established terrorism researchers who critique the critical position.

Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and solutions. Burke makes this explicit: “The inauguration of this journal,” he declares, “indeed suggests broad agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism” (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism. For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract noun. More precisely, it is merely a tactic—the creation of fear for political ends—that can be employed by any social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved.

Ironically, then, strategic theory offers a far more “critical perspective on terrorism” than do the perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox standpoint when he asserts: “to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate” (p. 19). If you are a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim. Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote “absolutely illegitimate violence.”

Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does “appear to be a consensus” that terrorism is a “form of instrumental political violence” (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary connotation of moral condemnation. “Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion, atrocity, or great political crime,” Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point. All violence is instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have “specifically excluded states as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets,” is wholly inaccurate (p. 38). Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism.

Yet, Burke offers—as a critical revelation—that “the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist.” He continues: “My point is not to remind us that states practise terror, but to show how mainstream *strategic doctrines* are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated” (original italics) (p. 41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun.

Consequently, those interested in a truly “critical” approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion

In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments, terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be discursively engaged.

At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and “human emancipation.” Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama *Boston Legal* Judge Brown perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant, jargon-ridden statements of lawyers as “jibber jabber.” The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber. The pages of the journal of *Critical Studies on Terrorism* are its natural home.

#### Perm do the plan and the non mutually exclusive parts of the alternative – focusing the criticism on drones distracts from larger questions about the structures that perpetuate violence and ignores the reasons why other alternatives fail

Doug Noble September 10 2012 Is It the Drones or the Killings We Oppose? http://upstatedroneaction.org/wordpress/2012/09/10/is-it-the-drones-or-the-killings-we-oppose-americas-technological-fetishism/

US drone strikes make news every day, fostering worldwide outrage and public scrutiny. The drone has become an icon of US lethality and dominance, and it has understandably become a principal focus of our antiwar effort.¶ But recent controversial revelations about presidential-approved “kill lists,” used to identify targets for drone assassinations, suggest a broader scope for our opposition. US assassination and targeted killing, with presidential approval, has been going on covertly for at least half a century, and continues to this day, both with and without drones. Drone strikes may be merely the most visible portion of a wider, global program of US targeted killing, “a covert side to the Global War on Terrorism that is not visible and not currently knowable.”[1] Perhaps a limited focus on remote-controlled murder by drone technology blinds us to a broader US enterprise of targeted assassination around the globe. Shouldn’t we, then, turn more of our attention to this wider canvas of US killing, repositioning our drone protest within a larger context, rather than limiting ourselves by our focused opposition to drone technology?¶ In a recent article, “Assassination Nation,”[2] I trace the history of US targeted assassination to the US Phoenix Program in Vietnam, in which the CIA and Special Forces targeted and assassinated over 20,000 “suspect” civilians in a reign of terror from 1967 and 1972. Phoenix was the direct source of US counterterrorist kill lists and civilian assassinations in Latin American countries throughout the 1980s and, more recently, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ In Iraq, from 2003, a large-scale Special Forces covert war targeting Ba’athist insurgents for capture or assassination was called “preëmptive manhunting,” with all the earmarks of the Phoenix Program. [3] In Afghanistan, starting in 2009, a campaign of targeted night “kill/capture raids” against insurgents, up to 40 raids a night, were carried out by Joint Special Operations Command commandos killing 2,000Afghans in 2010 alone, mostly innocent civilians. One officer called the campaign an “industrial strength counterterrorism killing machine.”[4]¶ Meanwhile, top military advisors such as David Kilcullen have recommended “a global Phoenix program” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism.” [5] The Obama administration uses a six-point program for such “light-footprint warfare,” relying on raids by special forces, drone strikes, and proxy fighters, and also spies, cyber warfare, and civilian partnerships. [6] Worldwide, there is now a US special antiterrorism force of about 60,000 operating in as many as 120 countries, according to former US intelligence officials. [7] The Pentagon also develops “proxy” clandestine militias called “Counterterror Pursuit Teams” in many countries, for “remote killing” of a different sort, run by the CIA and U.S. Special Forces. [8] And the Pentagon now conducts joint military and counterterrorist exercises with countries in Africa, Central and South America, and the Asia-Pacific region. According to Andrew Bacevich, US Special Forces assets today go to more places and undertake more missions … than ever before.” [9]¶ There are, of course, very good reasons for the antiwar movement to focus its opposition on drones. There is a heightened media awareness of drone technology, with daily articles about their use in war and surveillance, and about the lives of their remote pilots, scattered on military bases throughout the country, fast replacing airborne pilots. Policymakers are currently on the defensive, forced to reveal hitherto top secret activities and policies behind the use of drones. The growing use of drones for domestic surveillance, by police departments and border control agencies, offers a powerful opportunity to raise public opposition to drones. Also, US protest against drones offers solidarity with the multitude of civilian victims of drone strikes throughout the world, and it capitalizes on this peculiarly menacing icon, reviled by the rest of the world.¶ There are, however, equally good reasons not to focus our opposition on drones. The wizardry of drone technology has great popular appeal in the US. According to Pew Research’s latest polling, 62% of the US public enthusiastically approve of drone use for remote-controlled killing in the war on terror. The New York State Fair now has a popular exhibit providing children the simulated thrill of piloting a drone mission. The burgeoning drone manufacturing industry appears unstoppable, with nearly 50 companies developing some 150 different systems, ranging from miniature models to those with wingspans comparable to airliners. Law enforcement and security agencies will have $6 billion in U.S. sales by 2016, for domestic surveillance. Altogether, the drone industry’s lobbying group, Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, claims 507 corporate members in 55 countries. There is virtually no Congressional opposition to the drone fever that has gripped the military, which is spending $4.2 billion on drones this year alone; one large bipartisan congressional committee is solely committed to promoting drone technology.¶ Furthermore, as the technology develops, drones will have many positive uses beyond war and surveillance, diluting potential opposition to the technology itself. So a continued focus on drones carries the danger of distracting our attention from the horrific, illegal and immoral, targeted killing of civilians, including women and children, which is the original motivation for our years of opposition and protest.

#### Military drones are a statistical outlier in tech development – resistance movements will model military tech developments and use them to dismantle power structures

Kevin Carson 13 is a senior fellow of the Center for a Stateless Society (c4ss.org) and holds the Center's Karl Hess Chair in Social Theory Feb 4, 2013 Bring on the Drones! http://c4ss.org/content/16916

Most analysis of drone technology from libertarian futurists these days is pretty pessimistic. They’re generally treated as part of a larger techno-fascist scenario, like the U.S. global hegemony (enforced by orbital lasers and remote-controlled UN teletroopers) depicted in Ken Macleod’s Fall Revolution novels.¶ That’s an understandable temptation. After all, drones (combined with mobile operations like the assassination of bin Laden in May 2011) seem to have given the United States an unprecedented ability to take out the leadership and many of the rank-and-file of networked resistance movements like al Qaeda, far more cheaply than the old model of counter-insurgency warfare.¶ Extrapolating from this, it’s not hard to imagine the United States government, as a full-blown techno-fascist regime fighting to stave off the collapse of corporate power in a few years, using drones and remote-controlled soldiers to shut down web servers in Iceland that host Wikileaks or Mega, kill M15 and Syntagma organizers on the Continent (and Occupy organizers in Oakland), take out garage factories producing knockoffs of GE’s patented goods, etc., or just flat-out assassinate political dissidents based on wiretaps from Ft. Meade.¶ Even John Robb, my favorite writer on networked resistance and asymmetric warfare, seems to take a dark view of the long-term effect of drones. The main advantage of his resilient communities, as he sees them, is that they’re too small, decentralized and hardened to present high-profile targets to states in their death throes.¶ But that’s far too pessimistic an assessment, in my opinion. The apparent spectacular successes of drone warfare in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen are actually just early adopter advantages accruing to the first powerful states to put drones to use. This says absolutely nothing about the overall effect of drone technology as we move down the cost curve — any more than we could have predicted the institutional effects of cybernetics and the Internet based on the enormous vacuum tube mainframe computers of the late 1940s.¶ It’s a fair guess that increasingly sophisticated, autonomous hunter-killer drones will be governed by an exponential rate of cost reduction comparable to that described in Moore’s Law. In a few years time, we can expect remote-controlled or autonomous armed drones available as open-source, off-the-shelf technology that networked resistance movements can churn out with cheap tabletop CNC machines in their own garage factories.¶ When that happens, and the “World’s Sole Remaining Superpower” loses its early-adopter advantage, drone technology will work to the advantage of the side with the most decentralized, distributed organizational infrastructure, and the most widely dispersed and hardened end-points. And it will disproportionately hurt the side with the most centralized, hierarchical form of organization and the most concentrated target profile. Anyone want to venture a guess as to which respective sides fit those descriptions?¶ Imagine, if you will, a world in which drones are cheap and widely available. Then stop and think about the target profile of the Empire and the corporate interests it serves. Imagine how easy it would be to get targeting information on the homes, churches and country clubs of the senior management and directors of the aerospace companies that make American drones. The Boardrooms and C-Suites themselves. The factories. The whole South Asian chain of command, from CINC CENTCOM down to battalion and flight headquarters. The logistical tail of the drones, including the control centers at every airbase from which drones are staged. Begin to get the picture?¶ Even as it is, the current American advantage in drones is just an outlier in the general trend toward cheap area-denial technologies (carrier-killing Sunburn missiles, mines, etc.). In fact the panic in U.S. ruling circles is so extreme that the latest U.S. Defense Guidance document was centered on the need to prevent the United States losing its regional power projection capabilities to such technologies — the 21st century equivalent of the most powerful army in the world being defeated by a guerrilla army using punji sticks and a bicycle-borne logistical tail.¶ In every conceivable way — agility, resilience, feedback/reaction loop — the emerging networked successor society runs circles around the old hierarchical corporate and state dinosaurs it’s replacing. As I’ve said many times, the twentieth century was the age of the large, hierarchical institution. By the end of the 21st, there won’t be enough left of them to bury

#### Burke embraces some forms of security and says it’s inevitable

**Burke 07**, senior lecturer in Intl Politics @ University of Wales, 2007  p. 16

(Anthony, “What Security Makes Possible: Some Thoughts on Critical Security Studies)

In some ways this critique-which cites writings by Michael Dillon and James DerDerian as examples-is appropriate. He might also have included in this list an m1icle published in 2000 by Costas Constantinou.52 While in some ways he misunderstands what they are searching for (a route out of generalised politics of alienation and fear, which make them as critical of realism as he is) it is imp0l1ant to remind ourselves of the legitimate and almost universal concern of individuals and communities for secure and stable lives. It is for this reason that in my own work I have often endorsed the normative arguments of the Welsh School, Tickner, the Secure Australia Project 01' the UNDP's 1994 Human development report. It might be possible to read Booth's comments as a critique of my argument in the introduction to In/ear o/security, which challenges realist policy discourses for generating Orwellian practices of security that sacrifice the security of others. I, however, am implicitly working with a contrasting human security ideal. This, manifestly, is not a celebration of insecurity. The power of statist ontologies of security nevel1heless led me to wonder if it might be better to speak of the human needs and priorities named by security in their specificity: conflict prevention and resolution, human rights, land and women's rights, the right to control one's own economic destiny, etc. My concern was, and remains, that security's 'perversion' into a 'metaphysical canopy for the worst manifestations of liberal modernity' has been too final and damaging. 53 We live in a world where security will continue to remain one of the most powerful signifiers in politics, and we cannot opt out of the game of its naming and use. It must be defined and practiced in normatively better ways, and kept under continual scrutiny.

## 1ar

### 1ar – case

#### Applying complexity theory leads to policy inaction

Hendrick 09 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” June, [http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)\*\*we](http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf%29%2A%2Awe)

It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau‘s argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role). There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known, whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in sufficient detail, or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages woolly thinking and imprecision. In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or unfeasible.

### 1ar – case

#### Policy simulation is good – key to effectuate change

**Eijkman 12 (**The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims\_in\_authentic\_learning\_report.pdf. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal)

¶ This is where simulations have come into their own. The operative word is ‘have’, as there is a substantive record of success, which will be shown below. The point is that simulations have demonstrated the capacity either singularly, or in combination with other learning methods, for dealing effectively with the learning demands posed by public policy development; and this is not just at post-graduate level in universities, but at the highest echelons of American military leaders and policymakers (see for example Brewer, 1984; Beriker & Druckman, 1996; Babus, Hodges & Kjonnerod, 1997; Andreozzi, 2002McCown, 2005 and attached reading list in Annexure 2.10). Policy development simulations are effective in meeting the learning needs of both early career and highly experienced practitioners. Simulations help them to deal more proficiently with a complex mix of highly adaptive, interdependent, and interactive socio-technical, political, and economic systems; their often uncertain systemic reactions; and their unpredictable unexpected and undesired effects (Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Jacobsen, & Wilensky, 2006; Bekebrede, 2010; van Bilsen, Bekerede & Mayer, 2010)

#### And we’re key to decision-making – talking about big impacts and making tough decisions on a big scale tests cost-benefit in its most extreme forms and makes it easier for us to make smaller decisions in our lives

#### Reps don’t cause war

Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, **most skeptical view of preemptive war**, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with theoutbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

#### Don’t prioritize anything over pragmatic action – they destroy political change

Owen 02

David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the **best account available to us**. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a **theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a **potentially vicious circle arises**. It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate.